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EMOTIONS AS ACCESS TO RELIGIOUS TRUTHS
Robert C. Roberts

Emotions such as joy, hope, contrition, and gratitude are especially fitting
ways to grasp the central Christian truths. These truths claim not merely that
certain states of affairs obtain (e.g. that God loves us and sent his Son to
redeem us), but also that these states of affairs are important-that is, are
ones it befits humans to care or be concerned about. Emotions are concernbased construals. A construal is a mental state in which an object comes into
"focus," in some terms, with an immediacy like that of sense-perception (it
is a "seeing-as"). Since these "terms" can be (indeed typically are, in part)
propositional, emotions are propositional attitudes, ways in which propositions become part of a person's "vision." As concern-based construals, emotions are a kind of perception that incorporates concerns as one kind of term.
The Christian emotions have a central and fundamental place in Christian
knowledge because (a) they make essential use of the Christian propositions;
(b) they are perceptions (yet without being sense perceptions), rather than
mere beliefs or knowledge; and (c) they essentially embody the concerns that
befit the Christian truths. No other type of mental state incorporates aJl these
Christian epistemic virtues.

1. Introduction
By Christian standards, what is the most fundamental or most perfect condition of mind in which to grasp such propositions as God was in Christ
reconciling the world to himself (II Cor. 5.19), and The heavens declare the
glory of God, and the firmament shows his handiwork (Psalm 19.1), and On
the third day he rose again in accordance with the Scriptures (I Cor. 15.4)?
One standard answer in the Christian community has been "belief." The
crucial difference between Christian and nonChristian is that the former believes these truths, though it is usually added somewhere down the line that
what we're really after is faith, and faith is not mere belief. A more ambitious
answer is that the Christian is (ought to be) one who knows these propositions. Knowledge is a higher quality state of mind than belief; the difference
is presumably that the knower of p has some warrant for p lacking to the
mere believer of p.
The second of the propositions above seems to resist the suggestion that
mere belief might be the ideal condition of mind, because the proposition
itself speaks of the heavens' declaring God's glory and the firmament show-
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ing his handiwork. A person who believes the heavens declare God's glory,
but without ever hearing for herself that declaration from the heavens, would
seem to be in an epistemically compromised position, like the color blind
person who believes that the top and bottom lights on a traffic signal are in
different colors but can't see that for himself. Perhaps part of what people
are getting at when they make knowledge, rather than mere belief, the ideal
state of mind in which to hold the Christian propositions, is something like
this: the warrant they have in mind is some kind of perception of the state of
affairs expressed in the proposition. The person who has heard the heavens'
declaration of God's glory does not merely believe, but knows that the heavens declare the glory of God; just as the person who sees the color difference
between the upper and lower lights knows that there is this difference.
Of course, having seen the difference in color is not the only way a person
might know that there is a difference in color. Color blind people usually
know that traffic signals have different colored lights. And similarly a person
might know, on authority from the saints of his community, that the heavens
declare the glory of God. But still, such people are in an epistemically inferior
position. It is more normal, at least in the normative sense of 'normal,' for
the person who believes that the heavens declare the glory of God to hear or
to have heard that declaration for himself. So it seems that neither mere belief
nor even mere knowledge of the Christian propositions meets the Christian
ideal.
The Apostle Paul speaks of "having the eyes of your hearts enlightened,
that you may know what is the hope to which [God] has called you, what are
the riches of his glorious inheritance in the saints, and what is the immeasurable greatness of his power in us who believe ..... (Ephesians 1.18-19a). He
speaks as though our hearts have a mode of perception ("eyes") of their own,
which gives them access to a knowledge of rich, glorious, and great things
in their richness, glory, and greatness. That is, the richness, glory, and greatness are themselves perceived by the heart.
Apart from such extraordinary religious experiences as visions and voices,
what is Christian perception? What is it to "hear" the heavens declare the
glory of God? What is it to "see" the handiwork of God in what is made? I
propose that a very important and probably the central form of Christian
experience is the Christian emotions: For the central truths of Christian faith,
the most fundamental (normal, perfect) epistemic access· is such emotions
as joy, gratitude, contrition, hope, and peace. These ground normal Christian
knowledge, as contrasted with mere Christian knowledge. Just as the normal
access to the proposition, "These leaves are green," is to see the leaves with
one's own eyes, so the normal access to the proposition, "Jesus died for your
sins," is to feel gratitude and peace and other emotions.
I realize it may sound odd (to rationalist and romantic alike) to claim that
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emotions are a fundamental and irreplaceable access to some truths. To empiricist rationalists, the experience of the senses is the normal access to truths;
to the more Platonic, maturity of reflection is most basic; to the Kantian that
most of us are, truths are accessed through a felicitous combination of theory
and observation. But (it will be said) emotions belong in some other, completely non-epistemic category. A romantic (or perhaps charismatic or mystic)
theorist puts great store by emotions, and might even speak of "truth" in this
connection; but will fidget at my talk about "truths" and "propositions": The
truths of ethics and religion and art are noncognitive, and that's the kind of
"truth" that emotions can access. But I shall argue that our cardinal access
to some propositions is the emotions. To make my case, I want to discuss the
intentionality of emotion-how an emotion is "about" what it is about (if it
succeeds in being about anything).

II. The Intentionality of Emotion: Perceptual Content
I'm feeling grateful to the neighbor man (A) for having covered my tomato
plants on that cold night last week when I was away on business (c). On the
construal account,2 this emotion consists of my construing A as having performed c benevolently-to-me-or-mine, where c produces a benefit for my
tomato plants, and where one of the terms of my construal is a concern for
the well being of my tomato plants and another is a desire or at least a
Willingness to receive benefits from A.3 Alternatively, I construe myself as
the recipient of A's benevolent performance of c, etc., or c as a benevolent
performance of A for me or mine, etc. 4 Let's use the first version of this
gratitude for our analysis.
Th~ terms of the construal are set by 5 the following propositions:
1.

A covered my tomato plants last night.

2.

In covering them, A benefited my tomato plants (me).

3.

In covering them, A benevolently intended to benefit the plants (me).

4.

A is someone it is good for me to be indebted to.

5.

The well being of the tomato plants A covered is important.

These propositions set what Searle6 calls the conditions of satisfaction of the
intentional state. Among the mental states for which Searle gives the intentionality in terms of conditions of satisfaction are beliefs, desires, and sense
perceptions. If I believe that my tomato plants have been covered, then since
belief is a truth-demanding intentional state, my belief will be "satisfied"
only if this proposition is true (that is, only if the intentional state fits how
things are). If I desire that my tomato plants be covered, then since desire is
a fulfillment-demanding intentional state, my desire will be "satisfied" only
if the covering of my plants occurs (that is, only if how things are fits the
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intentional state). If I see (with my eyes) that my tomato plants are covered,
it is again a condition of satisfaction of the intentional state that the plants
are covered. But in the case of visual perception the conditions of satisfaction
are normally determined by a visual experience. Visual experiences can have
different conditions of satisfaction than the subject's beliefs about what is
seen. For example, when I see a stick in a pail of water, the condition of
satisfaction of the visual experience is that the stick is bent; but at the same
time I believe that the stick is not bent ("I don't believe my eyes").
On the construal account, a felt emotion has an intentional content analogous to that of a perceptual experience. I do not merely believe or judge to
be true propositions 1-5, but these are synthesized in a construal of A, an
experience of him. A comes into focus for me as having benevolently done
something importantly good for me. It is a condition of satisfaction of an
emotion that the "perceived" state of affairs obtains (that the propositions
determining this state of affairs are true), but with a proviso analogous to the
case of a sense-perception: I need not believe (all) the propositions in terms
of which I construe the object or focus of my emotion. 7 Thus a person's
emotions can conflict with his judgments. Often when this occurs the emotion
is irrational, but it need not always be so. We do not think a person who sees
a mirage is irrational; it is better, in this case, for his beliefs to conflict with
his perception than it is for them to coincide. And having the visual experience characteristic of seeing a mirage does not indicate any malfunction of
one's visual apparatus. Since emotions are characteristically spontaneous
responses to situations, a similar non-irrational discrepancy between emotion
and belief may also arise. The disposition to get angry at the misbehavior of
children under the age of accountability seems to be just about as natural to
human beings as the disposition to have of-water-like visual experiences in
mirage-situations. Furthermore it can be defended as appropriate in terms of
its importance to the moral development of children; for it is an ascription
of responsibility that (in an otherwise proper setting of parent-child relationships) generates a responsibility that was not there. But the ascription of
responsibility that is ingredient in anger8 is not true (let us suppose) when
directed at a two-year old child. So the fully rational and virtuous parent is
one who in appropriate circumstances of misbehavior feels anger at his child,
while disbelieving at least one of the propositions in terms of which he
construes his child when angry at her. Perhaps too there are cases of feeling
Christian joy in which the subject does not (yet) properly speaking believe
the operating Christian propositions. In any case, the intentionality of emotion is significantly different from that of judgments, and an important difference is that, like sense perceptions, felt 9 emotions have an experiential
content that is capable of conflicting with the relevant judgments.
Emotions differ from other construals in that among their conditions of
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satisfaction is the condition that the state of affairs that is "perceived" has a
certain value or import; for the emotion is a perception of it as having that
import. Propositions 4 and 5 in the analysis of my gratitude to A claim not
just the existence of a fact (that he rescued my young tomato plants from
danger), but the value or weight of it (that this is an important thing to have
done and that A is a good one to have done it). So if I am inordinately grateful
to A for his act, because I ascribe more importance to the plants than they
have, there is something "false" or unfitting about the emotion. It does not
"fit reality." It fails to deliver truth. The emotion may be correct in perceiving
that there was a plant rescue, but quite off base in perceiving its gravity or
'weight. On the other hand, if I fail to be grateful at all, it is probably not
because I fail to notice that the neighbor has rescued my plants, but instead
because I underrate (fail to care sufficiently about) the plants or his benevolence, or because I desire to avoid being indebted to him. And here again, if
the plants do have a certain value or import, and A's benevolence is in fact
worthy of regard, my failure to feel the emotion is a failure to "see" something
about the situation. It is a case of missing truth.
Let us return to our proposition, In Christ God was reconciling the world
to himself. It can be a crucial term in a small variety of Christian emotions:
joy, gratitude, hope, peace, compassion. Let us take peace as our example. A
person will feel Christian peace when he perceives God, or himself, or the
world,1O in the following terms:
The world (I, we) was alienated from (in rebellion against, at war with)
God
2

God has reconciled the world (me, us) to himself: we are no longer at
war with him

3

The war was scandalous, despicable, miserable, wretched

4

The peace that God has established between us and himself is glorious,
precious, splendid

Again, sentences 3 and 4 are intended to express concerns: a negative concern
or repugnance toward the alienation from God, and a positive concern or
desire for the war's end. These concerns are as much terms of the construal
as are the propositions asserting the existence and end of the war. Within the
Christian framework it is clear that propositions 1 and 2 are not only true,
but the states of affairs that obtain if they are true have the weight or importance ascribed to them in propositions 3 and 4. Since the importance of these
states of affairs cannot be left out of an account of them, the truth of propositions ascribing this importance is essential to the truth of the propositions
representing the states of affairs. If this is so, it would seem to follow that
only a kind of perception that sees in terms of such a concern is a full grasping
of such a Christian truth as that in Christ God was reconciling the world to

88

Faith and Philosophy

himself. This is a truth that has to be seen with the eyes of the heart. As
concern-based construals, emotions are perfectly tailored for such truthgrasping.

III. Importance As an Object of Perception
A standard objection is of course that states of affairs do not have importance in the way they have their other features. This difference can be stated
crudely by saying that what a state of affairs is is determined solely by the
state of affairs, while the importance of a state of affairs is always relative
to a person or community. Importance is always importance to P, where P is
a person or community. Thus what is important to one person or community
may be unimportant to another; in each case what is of importance is whatever
happens to be of concern to some human beings. Importance is entirely
reducible to ascription of importance as embodied in the concern an individual or community has for something. Since all ascriptions of importance are
thus trivially satisfied, it cannot be a condition of satisfaction of an emotion
that some state of affairs has one or another importance. Emotions may be
concern-based perceptions, but they do not make the kind of objective valueclaims that I say they do.
I grant that importance is always importance to P, and that concerns and
importances are conceptually connected. But they are not connected in the
way the objection has it. It is not the case that whatever P is concerned about
is actually important to P. What is important is what P ought to be concerned
about, and proper concerns are about what is important. From the fact that P
is concerned with x it follows only that x seems important to P, not that x is
important to P. There are norms here. We criticize persons, and even societies,1I for being strongly concerned about what is relatively unimportant, and
for being unconcerned about what is important. And this occurs not least in
our evaluation of people's emotions: We may criticize an instance of anger
not only for attributing responsibility where there is none, or offense where
there is none, but also for exaggerating the importance of the offense-for
being more concerned about it than its importance warrants. From the fact
that the importance of something can only be fully appreciated by someone
with an appropriate concern, or that improper concerns, just like proper ones,
create an impression of something's importance, it does not follow that the
concern is what gives importance to the thing.
Further, the intentionality of most emotions makes the import of the object
just as non-subject-relative as its more "factual" ascriptions. It is a condition
of satisfaction of most anger that the perceived offense (itself) is important,
just as it is a condition of satisfaction of the visual perception of a red apple
that the apple (itself) is red. It is true that an angry person may construe the
offense as important only relative to his own actual concerns. ("I know it's
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of no real importance if somebody comments about the way I'm dressed, but
I care about it anyway [that is, it seems important to me], and I'm mad!")
But this is not universal, or even typical of anger. Typically the individual
takes the offense to be important simpliciter (say, as an attack on her dignity).
In some cases the offense, and thus its importance, is regarded as not even
remotely connected with the angered person's private interests. If I am angry
about injustices in South Africa, it is not a condition of satisfaction of my
anger that this injustice is offensive to me l2 , but just that it is offensive. If
somehow it turned out that importances were all relative to individuals and
communities, we would have discovered in emotions a fundamentally deceiving function of the human mind. (To people who don't trust emotions anyway,
this will of course come as no surprise.)
Importances are of course relative, in the sense of specific, to individuals
and communities as they find themselves in one or another role or circumstance. The husband of the adulterous wife is the one to whom her action is
most important; it is fitting for him, and not the gossips down in the valley,
to be concerned about it, and thus to experience the called-for emotions. It
is the community whose high school is ravaged with cocaine that ought to
be most concerned about this, because it is this community to which the issue
is of present importance; to the extent that other communities are fittingly
concerned with this community's problem, it is because they fittingly regard
themselves as partially continuous with the first community. It is part of the
analysis of importance as importance-to-P that importance is "relative" in
this sense. But this fact does not at all call into question the claim that adultery
and cocaine are matters of importance, quite independently of whether anybody is concerned about them.
What is taken to be important will be relative to a system of beliefs (an
ethic, a virtues-system, a worldview). For example, in one ethic adultery may
be a very important offense, and thus warrant (or require, for proper perception) rather intense anger, while in another it may be hardly an offense at all.
But this no more implies that there is no fact of the matter about the importance of adultery, than the fact that different cultures have different astronomical beliefs implies that there are no facts of the matter about astronomy.
That it is important for children not to die, for people not to be gratuitously
insulted, for people to have nutrition and opportunities to take up and exercise
roles in the community, for certain people to create beautiful things and others
to become very learned, for persons to give one another gifts and regard one
another with benevolent feelings, for persons to worship their Maker and be
granted forgiveness of their sins-these facts are established by the nature of
the human organism and the universe in which it finds itself. Some virtuessystems may reflect a more or less distorted view of human nature, with
consequent distortions in the concerns of those who assimilate it: lack of
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concern for some things that are important, and/or an exaggerated concern
for some other things. (From a Christian point of view any system that
neglects the human's status as creature will have to distort human nature to
some extent, and to that extent the emotions generated in that virtues-system
will be unreliable as perceptions of what is important.)
A broadly Aristotelian project of investigating what it is for human beings
to flourish as individuals and as communities may help decide what is (objectively) important. It will of course ascertain what is important for us as
human beings, and is thus relativistic to that extent. 13 (Quite different things
might be important to Martians.) But more objectivity than this we can hardly
expect from "the humanities." As Christians we have another way of construing the objectivity of the important: What is important for us is what God
regards as important for us. Just what this is may remain to some extent
obscure to us, but at least we have a firm way of conceiving the basis of what
is important (whatever in particular that is). (Some might think that this is a
more solid basis for importance than mere human nature, but I think that for
the Christian these really come to the same thing. God's opinions about what
is important for us presumably reflect our nature, which God knows better
than we do.) The Scriptures, intelligently read, provide a general guide to
what is important-as it happens, a guide that ascribes great importance to
some things the world takes to be unimportant (for example, love and obedience to God, and the well-being of "unimportant" people) and relatively
little importance to things the world often takes to be very important (for
example, wealth and personal power). As such, Christianity is a challenge
and a tutor to the patterns of our emotional response.

IV. The Intentionality of Emotion: Causal Condition
So far I have suggested that, because an emotion is a kind of perception of
whatever it is about, in terms of propositions, in which the import of those
propositions is also perceived, Christian emotions are particularly well suited
to playa fundamental role of access to the central Christian truths about God,
the world, and ourselves. I have not stressed the role that emotions might
play in justifying the Christian propositions. Instead, I've assumed that we
know these propositions to be true, or at least are justified in taking them to
be so. To put the point another way, I have argued that if the Christian
propositions are true (and thus have the import they claim to have), emotions
are the way in which that truth is perceived, and thus a crucial aspect of the
highest quality knowledge of the propositions. I now raise the question of
justification.
Do emotions have justificatory epistemic force? Do they support, or provide grounds for, the propositions that form (part of) their terms? Does my
anger at Ned for breaking my lawnmower have any tendency to show that
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Ned broke my lawnmower, or that in doing so he was blameworthy, or that
what he did was important to me?
I hold that emotions are "perceptions," but in one way the intentionality of
emotions seems to be more like that of beliefs than like that of sense perceptions. Sense perceptions have a causal condition of satisfaction: The conditions of satisfaction of my seeing a purple gerbil before me are not just that
there is a purple gerbil before me, but also that that gerbil's being before me
is causing me to have the visual experience I'm having. But if the gerbil's
being before me is in fact causing me to have the visual experience, then
there is a purple gerbil before me. Because of this causal aspect of the
intentionality of sense-perception, my having a visual experience of a purple
gerbil before me is prima facie grounding for the belief that there is a purple
gerbil before me. This is of course not to deny that persons may have visual
experiences of purple gerbils when no such thing is causing them to have the
experience.
I earlier urged that emotions resemble sense perceptions in having an experiential content that can be discrepant from the subject's beliefs. In the case
of emotion, however, the experiential content is not a deliverance of any of
the senses, and so cannot be directly ascribed to any impingement of the
world on the subject's senses. Thus the causal avenue open for sense perceptions is not available here. It is not a condition of satisfaction of my belief
that Ned broke my mower, that Ned's breaking my mower caused me to
believe that he did. The belief is fully satisfied if in fact he did break it; the
intentional content of the belief makes no claim about what caused the belief.
I think that the intentionality of emotions in general is in this respect like
that of beliefs: Like the conditions of satisfaction of a complex belief, those
of an emotion are completely met if all the propositions which constitute its
terms (including the ones about importances) are true. 14 This seems to me to
be the case for the general run of emotions.
Perhaps, however, some emotions do not belong to the general run, but
have among their terms a proposition making a claim about the cause of the
emotion. Christian doctrine does have something to say about the origin of
the Christian emotions. For Christian joy, peace, contrition and gratitude are
known as fruit of the Holy Spirit; the idea seems to be that God is in some
especially immediate way their cause. This might, of course, be nothing but
an after-the-fact explanation, and not embedded in the intentional content of
the emotion. But given the intimacy, in the Christian context, between the
experience of (say) joy or peace and that of the presence of God, it isn't at
all implausible to suppose that in some particularly saintly instances of these
emotions God's agency in causing the experiential content of the emotion is
one of the things the emotion is an experience of. Such emotions will have
the causally self-referential character that Searle ascribes to sense percep-
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tions. A brief of our example of Christian peace might now go something like
this:
The world (I, we) was alienated from (in rebellion against, at war with)
God
2

God has reconciled the world (me, us) to himself: we are no longer at
war with him

3

The war was scandalous, despicable, miserable, wretched

4

The peace that God has established between us and himself is glorious,
precious, splendid

5

My experience of God (myself, us, the world) in terms of 1-4 is a result
of God's present work in me

Clearly, if we hold, as biblical Christians evidently do, that genuine Christian
emotions are caused by God's present work in the person experiencing the
emotion, then we must hold that any instance of a putatively Christian emotion would be prima facie justifying grounds for believing such other terms
of the emotion as 1-4. This is not to say that every putatively Christian
emotion is really one, any more than the claim that perceptions of x are in
general caused by x implies that any particular putative perception of x is
really caused by x.
Another limitation of the analogy between emotions and sense perceptions
is that the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit's work, with its embedment
in persons' patterns of emotional response, is not shared by nonChristians.
The belief that sense perceptual experiences are in general caused by what
they are of seems to be, by contrast, a natural belief-producing mechanism
in human beings, not requiring nurture, indoctrination, persuasion, or conversion. Consequently a testimony that x has been sense-perceived by a recognized honest witness tends to carry more weight with the skeptical than a
testimony that God has caused someone (also a recognized honest witness)
to see the world as reconciled to God. Thus the apologetic usefulness of the
information accessed through the Christian emotions will be limited-though
it may not be completely useless. So again we see, as we did in our discussion
of importance, that while emotions may give us access to truths, they do so
only within a conceptual framework. IS If emotional perceptions are to be in
all respects correct, the framework supporting them must also be correct. 16

Wheaton College
NOTES
l. When I speak of emotions as "access" to truths, I do not have primarily in mind initial
access, as though emotions are the normal way for persons to realize for the first time
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what these sentences mean, or that they are true. I have in mind an ongoing access in the
life of the believer. Believers can get out of touch, or have never been in touch, with the
Christian truths, without failing to believe, or even know, the propositions in question.
And I use the word 'access' rather than the more usual terms of epistemology such as
'warrant' or 'justification,' because I am not primarily concerned with the tendency of
these experiences to support beliefs. Access to these truths both is something different
from believing or knowing them, and has value in the life of the believer independently
of its function of supporting belief. Emotions are states of personal being and forms of
communion with God, and also with oneself, nature, and one's human fellows. However,
at the end of the paper I do discuss briefly how emotions might function to warrant beliefs.
2. See my "What An Emotion Is: A Sketch," Philosophical Review, vo!' 97 (April 1988),
pp: 183-209.
3. "I saw his action in terms of the benefit to my plants" or "I saw what he did as very
important for me, as it was he who did it."
4. These different versions of the construal are just variants of focus, not of terms. Since
an emotion-token is individuated by its terms, these are all versions of the same emotiontoken. (I take the type-token distinction to be relative; what is a token in one context may
be a type in another. If one regards the distinction as absolute, then of course it doesn't
make sense to speak of different versions of a token.)
5. If the construal is a construal of A (Le., A is the "object" or focus of the emotion),
then every proposition that sets the terms of the construal must refer to A, at least implicitly,
for each of them gives another "aspect" in terms of which A is construed.

6. Intentionality: All Essay ill the Philosophy of Milld (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
7. For several years Robert Solomon has championed the thesis that emotions are
judgments. I agree that many judgments are lurking in the neighborhood of virtually any
emotion, but I insist on A) the distinction between the judgments and the perception
(construal) that the judgments (if they be such) give rise to in the case of emotion, and B)
the fact that a proposition can set up the terms of a construal without the proposition's
being taken to be true-that is, without being the content of a judgment. In a recent article
Solomon notes Aristotle's assertion, in the Rhetoric, that emotions are perceptions, but
conflates this with his own view that emotions are judgments. "On Emotions as Judgments," American Philosophical Quarterly, vo!' 25 (April 1988), pp. 183-91. For more
criticism of Solomon, see "What An Emotion Is."
8. I am, of course, assuming that one of the propositions in terms of which an angry
person construes the "object" (0) he is angry at is something like

o is morally responsible for x.
The evidence for this is twofold. First, anger generates the desire to punish 0; angry
behavior is punitive and among rational people, anyway, people are punished only for
what they are morally responsible for. Second, a fully rational person who is angry can
be, in the central cases, disabused of his anger by being shown that 0 is not morally
responsible for x (of course 0 may be instrumentally responsible for x without being
morally responsible for x).
9. Unconscious (unfelt) emotions can also conflict with our beliefs. This implies that
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they too have a "content" independent of our beliefs. Is there anything analogous in the
case of sense-perception? Weiskrantz's subjects (see Searle, p. 47) had "blind sight," that
is, through directing their eyes at objects they could characterize the objects, yet without
a visual experience. Now it would seem plausible, since these patients used their eyes to
perfonn this feat, to suppose that they were operating with some kind of visual "data,"
even though these data were not conscious. That is, it is implausible to think that nothing
mental was mediating between the act of directing their eyes and their coming up with the
characterization of the object. Whatever these "data" are would be the visual analog of
the "data" involved in an unconscious emotion (construal). In neither the emotion case
nor the sense perception case is the consciousness of the data essential to the possibility
of their conflicting with the subject's beliefs.
10. Again, these are three possible foci for the same emotion.
II. E.g., a "materialistic" America.
12. Nor only that it is offensive to some South Africans, either.
13. The only extended discussion of importance I know of is Jonathan Harrison's "The
Importance of Being Important" (Midwest Studies ill Philosophy III [1978], pp. 221-39).
His view is that "the importance of important things is dependent upon human needs and
wants and concerns and interests" (p. 223), and he contrasts this with the view that "the
importance of important things is roughly speaking part of the nature of things" (ibid.).
Yet he does not admit that importance is always importance-to-P. Thus, when we human
beings claim that something is important, we are taking it "for granted that human beings
are the only intelligent sentient beings there are" (p. 239). My view places more emphasis
on human needs (taken in a broad sense, certainly not limited to needs for survival) than
on wants and concerns, and distinguishes actual concerns from humanly proper concerns.
Thus it would not strike me as "disheartening" (p. 239) if, upon finding other and
significantly different intelligent life in the universe, we had to quit saying of some things
that they are simply important, and start saying that they are important to human beings.
Also, there is no breach, on my view, between making importance depend on human needs,
and making it part of the nature of things; the nature of human beings is, after all, part of
the nature of things!
14. An emotion may have mood-creating terms that are very difficult to express in
sentences. If these terms can, in principle (perhaps not in actuality) be expressed in
sentences, then they can be true or false, and the above formula holds. On the other hand,
if there are terms that are essentially nonpropositional, then they are also not true or false,
and so that aspect of the construal will be non-intentional, which is to say that it will have
no conditions of satisfaction.
15. Elsewhere I have called such a framework a virtues-system. For more on such
systems, see my "Virtues and Rules," Philosophy alld Phenomenological Research, vol.
51 (June 1991), pp. 325-43.
16. This paper was read at the 1989 Wheaton College Philosophy Conference, and I
would like to thank those who discussed it with me in that context, especially Steve
Bilynskyj. Also, thank you to Amelie Rorty for discussing the paper with me.

